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MR. KEYTE:

Good morning, everybody.

This is the 45th Annual Conference on
International Antitrust Law and Policy.
my fifth year as Director.

I think it’s

Barry Hawk will be hopping

around here somewhere.
We started the Economics Workshop four years
ago.

The notion is to have young lawyers, young

economists, and enforcers from around the world get an
earlier access to some of the economics that’s going
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on across a variety of topics. This year’s sponsors
are Compass Lexecon, which will do the morning session
on two merger topics; and The Brattle Group in the
afternoon will cover the AMEX decision and structural
modeling.

I’m going to moderate the Structural

Modeling panel because I had some brief exposure to it
and really had no idea what it was.

I thought I knew

these things, but I didn’t. It should be a very
interesting panel.
We’re excited to have the Economics
Workshop.

It has been extremely useful, especially

for the young lawyers who sometimes find themselves
being asked to do things on cases or mergers or
investigations and often have no idea what the senior
people are talking about or what the economists are
talking about.

So this is a great way to get that

kind of exposure, and it’s also a great way, because
of the international nature of the conference, to
exchange some ideas on economics in the global
setting.
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Let’s get started with Compass Lexecon.
David Weiskopf is going to run the first panel.
hope you all enjoy it.
Thank you.
* * *
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Panel 1: Merger Remedies
Moderator:
David Weiskopf
Executive Vice President, Compass Lexecon
Panelists:
Mark Israel
Senior Managing Director, Compass Lexecon
Aditi Mehta
Economist, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice
Alex Okuliar
Partner, Orrick
Sonia Pfaffenroth
Partner, Arnold &Porter Kaye Scholer LLP
* * *
MR. WEISKOPF:
with Compass Lexecon.

Hello.

I’m David Weiskopf

Welcome to the morning session

of the Economics Workshop.
We’ll begin with the first panel, which is
Merger Remedies.

We have a distinguished group of

panelists with us this morning including two
economists and two attorneys.

The two economists are

Mark Israel, Senior Managing Director at Compass
Lexecon, and Aditi Mehta, Assistant Section Chief of
the Economic Litigation Section of the Antitrust
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.
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attorneys are Alex Okuliar, a Partner at Orrick, and
Sonia Pfaffenroth, a Partner at Arnold & Porter.
We’ve organized the session around several
topics related to merger remedies.

We’ll start with

an introduction and overview; then we’ll discuss
behavioral versus structural remedies, the
intersection of merger remedies and merger
efficiencies; and then, time permitting, we’ll discuss
issues in determining a divestiture buyer and ensuring
it is an effective competitor.
The format is going to be question-andanswer and we welcome questions at the end of each
topic and also at the end of the overall panel.
We are going to begin with an introduction
and overview of merger remedies.

Aditi, let’s start

with what is the purpose of merger remedies.
MS. MEHTA:

The overall purpose of merger

remedies is to effectively and quickly address the
competitive harm from a merger.

That requires

determining the nature and the scope of the harm from
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the merger and then tailoring the remedy to address
that harm.
As you’re crafting the remedy you really
want to try and retain as many of the benefits and
efficiencies from the deal as possible.
The other thing I’d say is the goal is to
restore the competition that’s lost from the merger,
not to increase the competition in the market relative
to the premerger levels.
MR. WEISKOPF:

What are the main types of

merger remedies?
MS. MEHTA:

Typically, the types of merger

remedies are put into two categories, structural and
behavioral.

There’s also a third category that is a

hybrid, conditions that look like behavioral remedies
but are really put in place to make a structural
remedy more effective.
When people talk about structural remedies,
they are thinking about remedies that restore the
competitive structure of the industry.

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

Typically,

7

this means a divestiture of assets, which can include
plants, retail locations, customer contracts, that are
sold to an independent firm in the market, and that
can either be a new firm entering the market or
strengthening an existing competitor in the market.
These structural remedies tend to require very little
ongoing oversight.
The second category is behavioral remedies.
In behavioral remedies, the firms integrate fully, but
then there are conditions or prohibitions put on their
behavior or conduct.

One example is a supply

agreement where the merged firm is required to supply
rival firms in the market.

These are typically more

difficult to implement and require some more ongoing
oversight.
rival

So for example, a requirement to supply a

may require conditions put on what price the

merged firm can charge its rivals or how to deal with
quality changes over time or new products.
The third category is conditions to
strengthen a structural divestiture.
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a buyer of divested assets, t to be an effective
competitor they may need access to certain
intellectual property (IP) that the merged firm has.
In that case there may have to be conditions on how
the IP is shared between the merged firm and the buyer
of the divested assets.

These look like the

conditions or prohibitions you may see in a behavioral
remedy, but they’re really there to strengthen the
structural remedy and make the independent competitor
in the market more effective.
MR. WEISKOPF:

Thank you very much.

To what extent does the approach to merger
remedies vary across jurisdiction?
MR. OKULIAR: David, would you like me to
address that?
MR. WEISKOPF:

Yes, please.

MR. OKULIAR: I’ll do a survey of
jurisdictions around the world and focus on the most
active ones beyond the United States.

I’ll talk a

little bit about the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
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and Department of Justice (DOJ) but focus on DG-COMP,
the United Kingdom, Canada, China, and South Africa.
First, most of these jurisdictions say that
structural relief is good.

They put it into the

“good” bucket because of the reasons that Aditi just
mentioned.

They typically view behavioral remedies as

problematic except in certain limited circumstances,
like vertical deals.
But what’s interesting is that a recent
survey showed that in 2017 there were 155 remedies
globally.

Of those more than half, 52 percent, were

behavioral or hybrid.
So why is that?

You’ve got on the one hand

most jurisdictions indicating that structural is the
way to go, and divestitures in particular, for relief,
but in fact they are actually implementing behavioral
remedies.

So there are a few reasons.
First, a lot of agencies are looking at

vertical deals right now.

As we know from some of the

high-profile litigation here in the United States,

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

10

there is a focus here in the United States and also in
Europe on vertical matters.
Another reason is that there is a big focus
on technology deals right now and will be into the
foreseeable future, and divestitures typically don’t
work when you’re looking at issues like data or
technology access.

So there are behavioral remedies

typically imposed in those situations.
Another reason that I find fascinating is
that there are really two groups of enforcers around
the world.

First, there is a group that does focus on

structural remedies because it follows from their
statutory mandate.

So they have competition factors

in either their statutory mandate or their common law.
As a consequence, they are going to be looking for
competition solutions.

In those instances — that

includes DG-COMP, the United States, the United
Kingdom, Canada — typically their remedies are more
than 70 percent structural.
views.
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There are some differences across them.

For

example, at DG-COMP the European process is a little
different than the U.S. process with respect to
remedies.

Remedies tend to come at the end of the

investigatory process.

There is a submission of

commitments or proposed commitments, which is what
they refer to them as in Europe, to DG-COMP.

DG-COMP

does a market test and then, if it is satisfied that
the commitments will address the perceived competitive
harm, it will grant conditional clearance for the deal
subject to finding a purchaser for it in a divestiture
circumstance.

Then there will be a submission of

proposed purchasers and there is a review of the
purchaser to determine if they have characteristics
that would lead to success — independence, financial
ability, operational capabilities, and the like — and
then a final decree is issued allowing for the
purchase to be consummated.
As a result, as compared to the United
States, fix-it-first remedies are actually very rare
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in the rest of the world.

Again, a recent survey

showed that in the United States fifteen of twenty-one
divestiture remedies were some form of fix-it-first,
which means that the potential buyer was identified
upfront by the parties and the agency; only six out of
seventeen were fix-it-first in Europe or could be
characterized as fix-it-first, six out of fourteen in
the United Kingdom; and I’ll talk about China in a
little bit.
Also within this first group of
jurisdictions that tend to focus on structural
remedies, where they do look at behavioral remedies in
recent years they’ve been tending to accept behavioral
remedies earlier in the investigation cycle, in Phase
1 typically.

What that suggests to me is that many of

the issues are relatively easily resolved or relate to
what I said before, a focus on vertical deals or on
technology deals where something as simple as a
firewall might remedy the competitive concern.
Where an investigation in these nations goes
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into Phase 2 and is a more in-depth investigation,
it’s very unlikely that a behavioral remedy will
ultimately be used.

In the last year I don’t believe

any such remedies have been passed at the European
Commission or the United Kingdom.

In the United

States, overall I think 91 percent or better of
remedies are divestitures.
That’s the first group of enforcers.
There is a second group of enforcers that
have a different statutory or common-law mandate in
their countries that include public-interest factors
or other types of market factors.

This group includes

China, South Africa, some of the Common Market for
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) countries in
Africa.

They have tended to use more nontraditional

forms of remedies.
China, for example, has frequent behavioral
remedies, oftentimes to protect for instance a
domestic player or some other issue or concern with
the national market.
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were behavioral in China.

There were three

divestitures and only one of the three was a fix-itfirst.
Some of the behavioral remedies that we’ve
seen come out of China over the last several years
have been supply agreements with Chinese domestic
companies; IP licenses; there have been long-term
hold-separate agreements that were put in place under
consent decrees that have proven pretty controversial
outside of China.

Seagate/Samsung is a good example

of that, if folks are familiar with it or want to look
it up, the combination of two hard-disk drive
manufacturers.

The deal was allowed through, but the

parties were told they had to keep the operations
separately, and they ultimately were, I think, allowed
to integrate about four years later.

Last year there

was a similar consent with a two-year automatic
expiration date on it.
There have also been divestitures.

In

Glencore/Xstrata, which was a large mining deal, there
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was a divestiture of a Peruvian copper mine to some
Chinese investors because there was a concern about
supply of copper for the technology industry.
These are relatively nontraditional remedies
that we’ve seem come out of the Ministry of Commerce
of the People’s Republic of China (MOFCOM) over the
last several years, now the State Administration for
Market Regulation (SAMR).
South Africa also accounts for a lot of what
I think would be viewed as nontraditional remedies.
There is also a broader public-interest mandate for
the Competition Authority.
employment in South Africa.

They are very focused on
One of the first examples

of that was the Walmart/Massmart deal, where they did
impose certain job and employment requirements on the
parties.

Out of the 155 remedies that I mentioned in

this survey last year, thirty-four were from South
Africa and were focused primarily on jobs.
That’s my survey of the world.
MR. WEISKOPF:
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thorough.

Much appreciated.
So, Alex, are there certain types of mergers

or industries that are more conducive to theoretically
sound and practically feasible remedies than others?
MR. OKULIAR:

Yes, there certainly are, but

I think the predicate question is: what constitutes
effectiveness for purposes of a remedy?

What’s the

right metric?
The International Competition Network (ICN),
which has done a really great job in bringing nations
together to talk about merger remedies and in putting
forward best practices, has identified four factors
that I think are pretty compelling that folks should
keep in mind in determining whether a remedy is
effective.
• First, does the remedy have a
comprehensive or will it have a comprehensive impact
on the putative competitive harm?

That’s why I think

structural remedies, such as divestitures of lines of
business, are so heavily favored, because they are
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viewed as being comprehensive in remedying the
potential competitive harm.
Then you would look at whether there is a
minimal risk of failure.

In that you consider the

package that is being divested:

how high is the risk

that the package is not viable, that you’re only
divesting, say, a select group of assets and to
compete in the market the buyer would need a broader
set of assets, for example?
Purchaser risk is another element that’s
looked at within the overall risk-of-failure factor.
So you look at, as I mentioned earlier, whether a
purchaser has the financial wherewithal, the
operational capability, the managerial experience;
their independence and intent to compete have been
very important, at least in my time at the agencies;
and also that the purchaser doesn’t themselves present
an antitrust issue in the purchase, so there isn’t a
huge overlap, for example, or a vertical issue.
There is also implementation risk, some of
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which is outside of the control of the agency and the
parties — that would include for example macroeconomic
conditions changing — or creating bad incentives as a
consequence of the divestiture or the remedy that
would incentivize the parties or third parties not to
compete in the market or to circumvent the remedy in
some way.

That’s factor 2, the risk of failure.
Number 3 would be practicality.

One of the

things that has bedeviled a lot of remedies in years
past — there was actually just a paper on this about
six months ago — is complexity in the remedy.

For

example, because in Halliburton/Baker Hughes there
were twenty-three markets at issue, the DOJ ultimately
I think decided that there really wasn’t a workable
solution, there wasn’t a workable fix there, because
it would be so complex.

So a practical,

straightforward solution is viewed as a way to be
effective in remedies.
And then the fourth factor is the
appropriate duration.
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mentioned, you’ll have behavioral remedies that are
associated with or support structural remedies for
limited periods of time.

So it’s knowing how to gauge

the length of time, the duration, that the remedy is
put into place for.
Ultimately, the bottom-line question you’re
asking is: Does the remedy package maintain or restore
competition to premerger levels and does it create the
right incentives for competitors in the market to
compete after the deal?
With all of that in mind, I would say that
in my experience obviously horizontal deals, where you
can divest a line of business easily, where there
aren’t big brand implications to divesting the
subsidiary or the division, are going to be the ones
that are going to be the most successful typically.
I’ve seen those in the energy sector in oil
and gas; I’ve seen it in manufacturing; chemicals;
pharmaceuticals, where you have a pipeline drug or
where you can shift or transfer the manufacturing

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

20

easily from the divestment parties to the purchaser;
and then retail is another area where you can see a
lot of success.
MR. WEISKOPF: Okay, great.

Thank you so

much.
Before opening up for questions from the
audience, panel members, any comments or thoughts so
far?
MR. ISRAEL:

I can jump in with a couple of

thoughts on remedies generally.
One thought I had is that it seems
interesting to me that this topic is part of the
Economics Workshop because one thing I find in
practice on the side of the merging parties is that
often the economists for the parties are heavily
involved in the merits and debate about the merger and
whether it’s procompetitive overall or not, but then
when it comes to remedies the economists are often
somewhat sidelined.

So I think it’s good that we’re

talking about it in an economics workshop because I

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

21

think sometimes what happens is there is a debate
about the deal on its face and then when it comes to
remedies it sort of turns into horse trading a little
bit for what’s going to be acceptable and what’s not
and there’s not as much economic analysis.
I think that is just a sort of plea.

It

goes with the theme, I think, that I almost would
rather not call them remedies.

Really what we’re

trying to do is to restructure a deal in a way that
would make the deal pass muster from an antitrust
point of view, the same way deals get shaped to pass
muster from the financial and strategic point of view
and then there’s an antitrust process to deal with
that part of it too.
Generally, very early on in the process,
probably from day one, the first time a firm calls a
lawyer, they know the lawyer can tell them, “You’re
probably going to need to have some sort of fix or
you’re not.”

In my experience, these things go best

when economists and lawyers are involved early on
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trying to shape that in a way that makes sense.
think you end up with fewer problems.

I

We’ll come back

to this more, but one thought is just there probably
needs to be more economic analysis of remedies.
One other thing, just reacting to some of
what Alex said, just picking up on that, one thing I
find that happens in practice is both internationally
and across agencies there can be interesting issues
about these differing views on remedies and how that
affects the outcome.
well.

Sometimes they don’t align very

Just something else to watch out for as you’re

working on them, so sometimes the different views that
different international agencies have on remedies
don’t align well.
Just one example, in airlines there are
airline alliances — OneWorld and Star — and these
alliances need to get antitrust immunity.
Historically, they obviously had to go in front of
regulators in multiple jurisdictions.

Historically,

in the United States, if there were specific routes,
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say between New York and London, or something where
people were worried about competition issues because
the carriers that would be in an alliance would
otherwise have competed, the United States’ approach
to remedy that would be to allow antitrust immunity
but to carve that route out, so the airlines can talk
about coordinating your schedule and pricing on some
routes but not that route.

Whereas the European

approach tended to be to ask for some slots — “We need
slots at Heathrow to give to other competitors” a
chance to compete.

It creates an interesting tension.

You end up giving sort of a double remedy for the same
problem because there are different views.
The same thing can happen even within the
United States.

If you work on, for example,

communications mergers, which have been hot, if the
DOJ and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
are both involved, they may have different views on
remedies.

I think a place you would see more

behavioral remedies might be if another noncompetition
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agency was involved.

I think, in addition to this

international question, an interesting issue to watch
out for is when different agencies have different
views on what the remedies should be.
MS. MEHTA:

I’ll just add to what Mark said

about the role of economists in evaluating merger
remedies.

Especially because so much of what the

right remedy is depends on what the theory of harm is
from the merger, there’s a really important role for
economists in doing that.
I’d say at the Division economists are
involved in the remedy discussions and figuring out
what the divestiture package has to look like, for
example, to make for an effective competitor in the
market, and I think it’s really important that
economists play that role.
MS. PFAFFENROTH:

I would add from the

practitioner perspective that, building on what Aditi
and Mark said about effective remedies and what’s
going to be necessary to remedy a concern, there can
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be a tendency on the part of business to want to
approach a remedy negotiation with the government like
one would approach a business negotiation, saying,
“Well, if you say one plant and I say three plants,
then two plants is clearly the correct answer.

That’s

where the effective remedy is.”
But from the perspective of the agency what
they should be

trying to do is convince the agency

that in fact what is being offered as a part of that
divestiture package or that asset package or the
business that is being proposed to be spun off is in
fact going to be effective, meaning, as Aditi said,
that it’s going to maintain the competition that
exists in the market premerger.
Helping businesses to understand that it has
to be approached from that perspective to be
persuasive to the agency is something that’s important
because it’s more in terms of explaining why it is
that this specific divestiture is going to be able to
maintain competition, as opposed to trying to find
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some reasonable middle ground from the perspective of
simple negotiation.
MR. WEISKOPF: Any audience questions or
comments before we move on to the next topic?

And as

I said, there will be an opportunity at the end as
well for any questions or comments.
[No response]
Moving on to the next topic, which is
focusing on behavioral versus structural remedies in
particular, Sonia, what is the difference between
those two types of remedies and why do antitrust
enforcement agencies tend to favor structural remedies
over behavioral remedies?
MS. PFAFFENROTH:

Aditi explained at the

beginning that you can separate different types of
remedies into a structural bucket or a behavioral
bucket.
If you’re talking about the structural
bucket, what you’re thinking about is what you think
of as a stereotypical remedy in a horizontal merger
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case, so a merger between competitors, which is
changing the structure of the transaction to eliminate
some competitive overlap.

That may be by selling off

tangible assets, by spinning off a standalone
business, by selling overlapping IP, by looking at
pipeline drugs.

But it’s a question of looking at

changing the structure of the transaction such that
whatever competitive concern is created by the
combination is mitigated by the remedy that’s being
imposed.
In the context of a structural remedy, the
agencies typically have a preference for a standalone
business.

That certainly is not possible in all

situations, but that goes to what Alex was saying: how
effective is this remedy going to be?

The concern is

going to be if you are taking simply assets and giving
them to another market participant or someone who is
not currently a market participant, are they going to
be able to compete with those assets in a way that one
of the merging parties would have been able to do
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premerger?
Because of that preference overall for a
standalone business, there’s also more resistance to
mix-and-match type remedies or overly complex remedies
that are taking pieces of both businesses — and I
think you could see this in what was said about the
Halliburton/Baker Hughes merger — creating a very
complex remedy gives the government less comfort that
that divestiture is going to in fact remedy the harm
that they have identified from the merger.
On the behavioral side, this can encompass a
fairly wide range of merger conditions — Aditi talked
about supply agreements — basically in a behavioral
remedy you’re talking about something that is going to
change the conduct or the behavior of the merged
entity post-merger in some way.

It may be a question

of restricting conduct that they might otherwise have
undertaken, it may be a question of compelling conduct
that they would not otherwise have chosen to take, but
in some way it is changing the ability of the merged
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entity to operate post-merger.
This is something that is frequently seen in
vertical mergers, as Alex said, because in a vertical
merger there may be no structural remedy; because you
have two companies that are in fact not competing, it
doesn’t have that stereotypical overlap where you take
the overlap away and you remedy the concern.
Types of behavioral remedies can include:
• As Aditi said, supply agreements of some
typically limited duration to allow a divestiture
buyer to be able to put itself in a position to
replace the competition that was lost.
• It could be a question of firewalls.

In a

vertical case, if you have a manufacturer acquiring a
supplier, like was the case in the FTC’s recent
Northrop Grumman/ Orbital ATK merger, there can be
concerns about information flow.

If that supplier is

still doing business with competitors of the acquirer,
the agency may be concerned about flow of proprietary
information.
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• Nondiscrimination provisions.

Similarly,

if a manufacturer is acquiring a supplier, maybe it’s
one of very few suppliers, and there is a limited
opportunity for competitors to the acquirer to be able
to get that component, then the agency may look for
nondiscrimination provisions to ensure that

inputs in

the future will be supplied in a nondiscriminatory
manner, that the competitors aren’t going to be cut
off from necessary inputs.
• There could be future licensing
requirements if there is, for example, a history of
licensing a certain IP, to ensure that going forward
licensing is done of fair, reasonable and
nondiscriminatory terms.
• Anti-retaliation provisions.

For example,

you could have a provision that says, “Well, if your
customers purchase from a competitor in the future,
you can’t retaliate against them” or “You can’t
retaliate for reporting potential violations to the
government.”
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• And of course supply agreements could also
have restrictions on contracting saying “The business
can’t enter into X type of exclusivity.”
So there is a wide range of types of remedy
that can be imposed that would fall into that
behavioral bucket.
From things the other panelists have already
said, the reason why there is a preference on the part
of the agency for structural remedies, notwithstanding
the fact that behavioral remedies may often be seen as
a part or a whole of a remedy in a given transaction,
is that there is that certainty that there’s a
separation between the merged entity and the
divestiture buyer, there aren’t restrictions on future
conduct.
That’s not to say that a structural remedy
itself can’t be challenging, because it can be, in
terms of identifying what all the necessary assets are
going to be for a divestiture buyer to be able to
compete; in terms of finding a feasible buyer that is
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going to have the same incentives to compete, as Alex
was saying; that is going to have the ability and the
experience to be able to compete in the way that one
of the merged parties would have.
But, all of that said, a structural remedy
is still something that is definitive in terms.
When you have a behavioral remedy, you have
something that is in fact controlling the competitive
conduct of a business going forward.
enforcement challenges.

That presents

It requires ongoing

monitoring to make sure, for example, firewalls are
being maintained; to determine whether contract terms
really are nondiscriminatory.

It can be challenging

on the part of the agency to draft that type of remedy
because it is forward-looking and trying to set out
restrictions that will achieve the goals of the remedy
while not being overly restrictive because that could
negatively impact the efficiencies of the transaction
because the remedy is distorting competition in the
market to a certain extent.
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interested in avoiding loopholes, to avoid the
possibility that the merging parties can end-run
around the intent of the remedy and thereby not
achieve what the government is looking for in terms of
a remedy.
There is always going to be a challenge
inherent if you are putting constraints on how a
business will compete in terms of particularly a
dynamic market — if the market changes, maybe it gets
beyond what that constraint was, maybe the constraint
is no longer necessary and maybe the constraint is
overly restrictive.
And they are of limited duration.

Unlike a

divestiture in which you sell the business, the
business is gone, the business is conducted by someone
else, behavior remedies necessarily are going to have
a term limit.
MR. WEISKOPF:

Thank you very much.

Also, any comments on the FTC Merger Remedy
Study that relates to this topic?
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MS. PFAFFENROTH:

The remedies study is

quite interesting because it looked at — and this is
following on a previous study — all of the merger
orders between 2006 and 2012.
in total.

There were eighty-nine

It assessed whether those merger remedies

were successful.

Some were, some were not, but for

the most part they found that the remedies were
successful.
I think particularly interesting to the
discussion of structural versus behavioral remedies is
that, unlike the previous study, which did not look at
vertical mergers, there were four vertical mergers
with remedies that were assessed as a part of this
remedies study.

The measure of success was whether

competition was maintained in the market, or restored
if that was the case after the fact, and whether there
had been enforcement of the behavioral conditions.

In

all four of the vertical transactions the FTC found
that they were successful remedies.
So I think that there can be a takeaway from
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that that certainly it is very case-dependent, as Alex
said, as to whether there is going to be a transaction
that is going to be susceptible to having a successful
remedy.
It may be that there are transactions in
which a successful remedy is not possible.

However,

there is the demonstrated look-back because the FTC
has the ability to go back and really dig into those
transactions and get information and talk to market
participants and find out what the effect was after
the fact, to be able to look back and say, “Yes, in X,
Y, Z cases these were in fact effective remedies; they
did maintain the competition in the market, they did
what they were supposed to.”

That is something which

has been the case in those specific behavioral
circumstances that were looked at.
MR. WEISKOPF: Thank you.
Mark, are behavioral remedies a useful tool
to offset expected merger harms; and, if so, can we
systematically identify the proper circumstances and
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types of remedy?
MR. ISRAEL:

Sure.

I think they can be part

of a toolkit to deal with harms that have been
identified.
But I guess I would say, to jump into the
second half of your question, the way I think about it
is — I may be overgeneralizing — I don’t think you see
many situations in which a deal is anticompetitive on
its face and the agencies have major concerns about
the deal as a whole in which pure behavioral remedies
will solve the problem — and by behavioral remedies I
really mean situations where you think the merged firm
has the incentive and the ability to harm competition,
to raise prices or reduce output, and they simply
promise not to. If you really think that sort of
incentive and ability is created by the merger as a
whole and you’re just trying to regulate it away by
saying “Here’s a price regulation or something we’ll
put on you,” that strikes me as not usually adopted
and unlikely to work.
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I think behavioral remedies are generally
part of the solution when maybe you think the merger
as a whole is generally good and has benefits but
you’re concerned about specific aspects of the deal or
specific segments or specific products or you can
identify a specific place of concern.
I think behavioral remedies, like I said,
are likely to work really if it’s a narrow sort of
specific targeted part of the concern and if the
concern is relatively well defined as far as what you
need to do, in the sense again that it means you’re
not trying to fix an overall anticompetitive deal with
a price regulation or something.

But also to me I

think the most important thing in a behavioral remedy
is it needs a clear benchmark.

Often firms will come

and say, “We’ll promise not to raise prices.”

“Well,

what would your prices have been absent the deal, and
what does that even mean, and how else might you
affect competition?”

Many firms in an industry where

prices have been declining rapidly will come to
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regulators and say, “We promise not to raise prices.”
Obviously, that’s not going to get very far.
But I think if you have a more narrowly
targeted remedy, then you can have a benchmark.

So in

some deals you might be concerned about competition at
a lower-quality, low-price part of a market — say in
telecom or something there’s a lower-end product and
there’s a higher-end bells-and-whistles product — and
maybe in some wireless phone merger or other merger
that might happen there’s concern about some
particular segment of the industry.

In that case,

maybe you would say, “Today you offer a package that
has 75 percent as much data at 75 percent of the price
and we would like a commitment that you will continue
to offer a package that has that proportion to your
top package,” such that if the market evolves the
remedy can change relative to a well-defined
benchmark.
So I think if you have that kind of narrow
setting — here’s a set of customers, we’re worried
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about a certain geography, we want to maintain the
products that are offered in that geography and the
prices relative to something else that’s being done
where we don’t have competitive concerns — you have to
be careful that doesn’t create strategic incentives to
mess up all the pricing -- but if it’s a narrow enough
part and you can define a benchmark relative to the
broader industry or relative to other products that
the firms sell, then I think there is some chance to
actually be able to enforce it.
MR. WEISKOPF:

Having a flexible remedy may

be very important in certain circumstances.
Mark, are there instances where remedies
other than divestiture should really be thought of as
structural remedies?
MR. ISRAEL:

It is interesting.

The way I

would take that is to say it’s not obvious to me this
is the right way to ask the question.

It’s natural to

define structural as meaning you change the structure
of the industry or the structure of the firm, and by
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that we might naturally mean divestitures, and
behaviorally you change the behavior of the firm.
I would say is it’s not obvious to me those
are the most interesting questions or the most
interesting way to think about remedies.

You could

hear a lot of this in Sonia’s answer as far as there
are issues with both types of remedies.
So I would slightly change the question and
say when I think about remedies, I actually want to
ask maybe two or three different questions rather than
whether they are structural or behavioral.
I think the most important first question
is: does it require ongoing enforcement?

I’ll give

some examples in a minute of things that maybe are not
classically structural but don’t obviously require
ongoing enforcement, at least not by the DOJ or the
Antitrust Agency.

That’s important too, right?

A big

part of the issue I think is that the antitrust
agencies are generally not regulators, that’s sort of
the opposite of their purpose, and so it’s natural not
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to want to require them to be ongoing regulators.

So

to me question number 1 is: Can you put in place and
let it go, or does it require ongoing oversight?
Question 2 would be: if it requires ongoing
oversight, is there some expert agency or court or
someone who can do that in a way that’s easier than
the agencies?

So communications deals where the FCC

is involved, airline deals where the Department of
Transportation is involved, might more naturally have
things that look behavioral but don’t require ongoing
oversight, at least by the antitrust agencies, but
somebody who’s more of an expert agency can do that.
Third, and probably what I think is the
single most important question — and it goes to what
Sonia said exactly — is: is the remedy in the
situation one in which the firm still has the ability
and the incentive to harm competition and they are
promising not to do it?

To me that’s the classic

behavioral remedy.
But to me the key question is really: Does
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the remedy, whether it’s structural or not, do
something about the ability and the incentive to harm
competition?

I will give some examples to make that

more concrete.
In structural remedies these issues about
whether there is ongoing oversight can easily be a
problem.

As Aditi mentioned, often you have to have a

structural remedy plus some three-year deal to
continue to provide IP or something.

That has to be

overseen, so now structural remedies, as Aditi said,
are blurring over into behavioral.
Most of the debate we always have about
structural remedies is: do they really eliminate the
ability and incentive to harm competition; have we
created enough competition to fix that problem?
So I think you’re naturally asking those
questions about structural remedies.

I think you

should be also asking those questions about behavioral
remedies, or what we call behavioral, and I’ll just
give two examples.
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In some cases it might be there are a few
large buyers of a product that might be harmed and the
merging parties are able to enter into a contract with
those buyers in advance.

Now, do we call that

contract structural or do we call it behavioral?

I

think what matters is that contract could be enforced
through the courts, if they are large enough buyers,
they have the ability to self-enforce, and we can look
at the terms of the contract and see if it actually
solves the ability/incentive problems that we’re
concerned about.

So even though we might call that

behavioral, I think we would evaluate it according to
these same questions.
The one other example I’ll give, which is
topical recently, without getting into recent cases,
is a remedy that has an arbitration provision.

Lots

of vertical deals, but even some horizontal deals, can
say, “If you’re worried about some specific
competition issue, we could have an arbitrator
evaluate that if it comes up.”
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interesting in a couple ways.
(1) Again, the agencies don’t have to be
involved, they can use the arbitration process, so it
is sort of self-enforcing.
And then (2) — and this is where it has come
up in recent deals — if the theories of harm are about
changing relative bargaining power.

A lot of recent

investigations are about a merger might give one side
more bargaining power than the other side.

One

solution to that might be to say, “We’re going to give
the other side the ability to take things to
arbitration if we think that the bargaining is being
done unfairly.”

That’s a tool given to the bargaining

of the other side.
I don’t think we as economists yet know the
answer perfectly to when arbitration works and when it
doesn’t, but I would say those sorts of arbitration
and contractual solutions ought to be evaluated in the
same way we evaluate what I think of as other
structural solutions and asking to what extent do they
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fix the incentive and ability problems, as opposed to
cabining them into these separate structural and
behavioral buckets.
MS. MEHTA:

To a large extent, having

arbitration as a remedy really depends on how
effective the arbitration can be.
MR. ISRAEL:
MS. MEHTA:
same problems:

Right.
So it comes back to some of the

can you figure out what the

competitive but-for price would have been, and that is
going to affect the bargaining dynamic, and effective
arbitration may not change that.
MR. ISRAEL:

Certainly I agree and that’s

one thing we have to think about.

I think the

interesting cases are these cases in which the
theories of harm are about bargaining because then the
ability to go to arbitration is part of the bargaining
game.

You are modeling what is the nature of the

bargaining, so I think the cases where arbitration
works best is where things never go to arbitration.
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It’s not the ability of the arbitrator to find a
perfect solution.
You do have to have an arbitrator who’s not
inherently biased, but if the arbitrator is not
inherently biased, then the expectation of both
parties is “If we go to arbitration we’ll end up at
some sort of solution.”

I mean you have to know what

that solution would be, but they’re thinking about
“What would happen if we go to arbitration?”

If it

works well, I think it’s because it changes the nature
of the bargaining game in a way that changes some of
the incentives and abilities we are worried about.
But that said, I don’t disagree that an
obviously ineffective or captured arbitrator would not
solve the problem.
MS. MEHTA:

And I’m not just talking about a

captured arbitrator; it’s just arbitration can be
hard.

Figuring out what the right but-for price is a

difficult exercise, and especially if there are
changing conditions over time or unforeseen changes.
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It’s not necessarily that there’s a biased arbitrator;
it’s just that that can be a difficult exercise to
undertake.
MR. OKULIAR:

Going to Sonia’s point

earlier, just having arbitration generally can place a
burden on the parties going forward that would distort
competition long term.
MR. ISRAEL:
all that.
discuss.

Just one comment.

I agree with

I think it’s an interesting topic to
I think that’s why the standard for good

arbitration — and it has worked pretty well in some
FCC cases — would be arbitration that almost never
gets used but that creates a backstop against which
there are some bargaining concerns we might have.

It

doesn’t force the arbitrator to find the perfect
price; it just means each side faces some risk if they
go to arbitration, which can create incentives to
reach a deal.
I think the best economic research on this
has been done more in the IP/patent FRAND setting,
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where bargaining in the shadow of arbitration can work
more effectively than bargaining absent the shadow or
arbitration, and what you hope is that that shadow
creates the right incentives to reach a deal.
MR. WEISKOPF:
that.

Just a quick follow-up on

So are we talking about more of a dynamic game

here in terms of the underlying economic theory, or is
this more of a static negotiation where you don’t
really contemplate sequential negotiations and
possible arbitration along the way?

Sorry, but the

economist in me had to ask that.
MR. ISRAEL:
are hard.

I don’t know.

Bargaining games

I think we generally model them in some

static sense.
I think, to get technical for a second, if
you are doing a Nash bargaining model or bargaining
models people often use, these models can admit
outside options.

So the two sides are bargaining and

negotiating, but with arbitration (or whatever it is)
there can be an outside option, a way to leave the
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bargaining game and start some other game.

So I think

the models would be imagine two parties bargaining but
one or both of them has some outside option to go
invoke arbitration.
If your question was then do we add to that
multiple rounds of negotiations with different parties
each of whom may arbitrate, I’d love to, but I don’t
think the economics of bargaining is that advanced.
MR. WEISKOPF:

Fair enough.

Yes, I think we

tend to revert to static models for a lot of the work
that we do.
Any other panel comments?
MR. OKULIAR:

Just one last quick comment

while we’re talking about these different structural
versus behavioral remedies.
I thought one of the things that was
interesting that came out of the FTC’s merger
retrospective remedies study was that it looks like
100 percent of the line-of-business divestitures they
deemed successful; 100 percent of the vertical
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behavioral remedies were deemed successful, but
roughly a third of the sale-of-asset divestitures were
deemed unsuccessful, so only two-thirds were
successful.

That points to a lot of potential issues,

a lot of risk associated with those types of asset
divestitures.
It also points to the informational
asymmetry that I think, Sonia, you were referring to,
on the part of the agency staff.

They are excellent

in their jobs, but they’re not market participants,
they have a limited window into what is going to
potentially work going forward in the market, and so
when you have staff actually working with the parties
to structure a deal, trying to guess which assets are
the right ones that are going to be viable, I think
that has been at least shown in this one study to be
potentially problematic.
MR. WEISKOPF:

Fair enough.

Shifting gears a little bit, we are going to
talk about the intersection of merger remedies and
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merger efficiencies.
Aditi, what is the relationship between
merger remedies and merger efficiencies and how does
it vary according to the type of merger remedy and
efficiency?
MS. MEHTA:

The goal of merger remedies is

to address the competitive harm but retain as many of
the efficiencies of the deal as possible.
In some cases crafting a remedy that retains
the efficiencies can be as straightforward exercise.
You can imagine there’s a merger between two companies
that have plants all across the country but the only
overlap between the two companies is, let’s say, in
the middle of the country, and so you are worried
about local customers who are purchasing in that part
of the country.

The efficiencies in that deal may be

something like increasing the distribution network of
the merged firm, which may allow them to better serve
national customers or reduce their transportation cost
let’s say.
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In that case you can imagine crafting a
remedy where the merged firm has to divest some of the
overlap assets in the middle of the country.

That

still allows them to retain the efficiencies from the
deal, the broader distribution network, but does
remedy the competitive harm.
When we’re thinking about crafting a remedy
we’re thinking about how the efficiencies of the deal
are affected.

But we’re not only thinking about the

efficiencies to the merged firm.

We also think about

creating an effective competitor that can restore
premerger competition: what about the efficiencies to
the purchaser of the divested assets?
In this example, the purchaser of the
divested assets is only going to get the plants in the
middle of the country.

Does that put it at a

disadvantage relative to the merged firm in a way that
would not allow them to effectively compete and
restore premerger competition?
When we’re thinking about the efficiencies,
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we’re thinking about for the merged firm post-remedy
can they still get some of the efficiencies from the
deal but also thinking about are we making an
effective competitor with the assets that are being
divested.
I think those are at least two ways that we
think about the interplay between merger efficiencies
and merger remedies.
There are more complicated cases where it is
not going to be as simple to retain the benefits of
the deal and still address the competitive harm.
For example, you can think of a case where
the merged firm uses the same assets both for the
product where there is an overlap and for products
where there is not an overlap and add to the
efficiencies from the deal.

In cases like that it is

going to be harder to craft a remedy that both
addresses the competitive harm and retains a lot of
the benefits of the deal or the efficiencies.
MR. WEISKOPF:
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Mark, should the goal of remedies be to
restore premerger conditions or to maximize consumer
welfare considering the effect of merger efficiencies?
Which of these goals do the enforcement agencies tend
to focus on?
MR. ISRAEL:
least in theory.

I think they focus on both, at

I guess this is a question where at

least as economists — I’ll make an extreme version of
the statement — I think most economists would agree
that the goal ultimately should be to craft a deal
that maximizes consumer welfare, but in practice the
focus ends up probably a lot more on whether the deal
restores premerger competition.
This probably goes to a whole different
panel that has been done and will be done again about
the relative weight that harms and efficiencies
receive in merger review, but I certainly think it’s
true that there can be a tendency — remedies are
complicated, as Aditi said, and there can be a
tendency when they get complicated to focus more — if
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there is one of these situations in which there is a
tradeoff between the efficiencies and the harms and
they’re happening in similar places, I think there can
be a tendency to focus more on “Let’s make sure we
restore the premerger conditions and not think as much
about the efficiencies.”
This really comes up — again I’ll say more
from what I know, which is the private party side —
there are lots of cases I’ve been involved in where
there is one workstream which is evaluating the merger
and arguing for the efficiencies from the merger and
why the merger is good, and then there is a separate
workstream that is happening on what the remedy should
be.

In some of those cases maybe I as the economist

would be heavily involved in the first workstream but
not in the second, and so then you get to see the
remedy package that is being proposed later in the
process and it sort of entirely undoes all of the
efficiencies that you’re arguing for, it divests all
of the assets that are central to those efficiencies.
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That’s part of my appeal earlier, working
with the private parties and working with the
agencies, is to have the economists more involved. I
actually agree with what Aditi said earlier; it seems
to me that the economists at the agencies are
generally pretty involved in the remedy discussions,
but Aditi can probably say that at the meetings she
goes to that have the least economists from the
parties are the remedy discussions.

I think that one

thing that could happen there on both sides is the
efficiencies part of the story can get lost.
An example is airline mergers.
a bunch of airline mergers.

I’ve work on

This is a classic case in

which the core efficiency of a good airline merger
would be bringing two airline networks together to
create more connectivity and a bigger airline network.
The key to that happening is that you bring these two
networks together.

But the key to bringing these two

airline networks together, the tie that binds those
networks together, is going to be a small set of
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routes that connect their hubs.

The ideal merger

would be one airline on one side of the country and
one on the other and they’re connected by one route
through the middle.

That route is going to be the key

to the efficiencies from the deal and it is also going
to be the focus of the potential harms from the deal.
I don’t have a perfect solution here.

I

would just hope that the benefit and the harm side get
discussed.

Probably it does in airlines, but in other

deals the focus will just be more “We’ve got to fix
that harm and the efficiencies be damned.”
One other thing, building on what Aditi
said.

I do think it is a common question on this

efficiencies-versus-harms question — and it’s
something we have to watch out for — is the
efficiencies come from economies of scale.
This is another two workstreams thing that
happens.

One workstream says you can develop the

arguments that economies of scale are the key and
that’s the source of efficiencies.
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workstream says develop the argument that a remedy
that starts some new entrant will be a full fix to
competition.

There is obviously tension there

potentially in terms of whether the scale economies
are required or not.
One thing that often helps me reconcile
these is that I think the right way to think about
that is that you are trying to recreate the smaller or
the acquired firm.

So it can be the case that the

merged firm can gain efficiencies from scale but still
recreate a firm that’s not in a worse position than
the smaller of the two of them was at the beginning in
an ideal case.
But again that’s a place where I agree the
efficiencies versus the harms can come into tension.
I don’t have a perfect answer, except to say if your
efficiencies are going to be credible and if this is
going to work, you better be thinking about that
interplay from the beginning.
MR. WEISKOPF:
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Alex, are there specific industries or types
of mergers or remedies where the two goals are likely
to diverge the most — that is the two goals (1)
restoring premerger conditions and (2) maximizing
consumer welfare?
MR. OKULIAR:

I think there are certainly

types of remedies where these two goals can diverge,
mostly behavioral remedies.
In a lot of technology deals that involve
either data or intellectual property or other types of
access to technology as part of a remedy, you have a
situation where there is potentially a temporal
mismatch, where you have short-term increases in
efficiencies as a consequence of giving competitors
access to, for example, data or standard-essential
patents or other intellectual property; but over the
long term there can be a chilling effect on innovation
that can harm efficiencies over the long term and it
can harm consumer welfare over the longer term.

I

think those types of remedies most likely tend to be

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

60

problematic.
I would also look at remedies where there is
an attempt by the agencies, as I mentioned earlier
with respect to the asset divestitures or single-asset
divestitures, to improve the market, where you see
agency staff or the parties working to better the
market and to move it to a new level.

You can end up

with significant implementation risk and failed
remedies that ultimately harm consumer welfare.
So those are two.
And then Sonia mentioned horse trading or
negotiation.

That kind of falls into the same bucket

as the single-asset divestitures, where you have the
agency staff and the parties negotiating back and
forth and they say, “Oh, we’ll just go for the middle
between the two of us.”

That’s also a situation where

you could have a mismatch between these two ends.
MR. WEISKOPF:

Excellent.

Thank you.

Any other panel comments before we move on
to the last topic?
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MS. PFAFFENROTH:

I would just add to what

Alex said that I think another situation in which you
may see a divergence and in which remedies can be
challenging are where you’re looking at a transaction
that has effects in both upstream and downstream
markets.

If you’re looking to remedy harm downstream,

what’s the effect upstream, are you reducing
efficiencies upstream, and how do you then weigh what
the effect is on the overall procompetitive aspects of
the transaction, on trying to remedy harm in one of
those two markets?
As Alex said also, in evolving markets,
dynamic markets, you’re imposing a remedy, you’re
looking forward, you’re trying to see where that
market is going to go, and it may be, particularly in
the context of a behavioral remedy, that the remedy is
constraining that evolution in some way that might
work against the overall goals of the remedy.
Going back to some of the things that Mark
was saying earlier on, the remedies and the
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efficiencies that you can realize from a transaction
are necessarily going to be intertwined.

If you’re

imposing a remedy, if you’re changing some aspect of
the transaction, whether it’s by imposing a structural
remedy and spinning off assets that would otherwise
have been able to be used synergistically between the
two entities, it may be that the synergies are
particularly significant because in fact there were
significant overlaps.

So there may be a tension

between the remedy and the overall efficiencies of a
transaction.
But whether it’s a structural remedy where
you’re selling off a piece of what would have
otherwise given rise to synergies in the transaction
or if it’s a behavioral remedy where there’s an
ongoing restraint on some aspect of the merged
entity’s ability to compete that is distorting the
market that is changing incentives going forward, it
is necessary to separate that from what the
efficiencies would have been had the parties simply
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been able to combine the two companies.

Any remedy is

likely to have some effect on efficiencies, a negative
effect diminishing the efficiencies.
I think that what that also highlights is
how important it is to narrowly tailor remedies in
merger cases to make sure that the remedy isn’t
broader than it needs to be to address the harm
because the broader the remedy the more impact it has
on the efficiencies of a transaction.
That’s not to say that there may not be
situations in a structural remedy where there is a
manufacturing facility and it is shared by more than
one product and only one of the products is an
overlap, but you cannot set up a divestiture unless
you spin off that asset, that is going to have an
impact that is broader than necessarily what is
absolutely required to address the overlap in the
transaction.

It may be necessary, but it is going to

have therefore further effects on efficiencies.
So where it is possible, particularly in the
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case of behavioral remedies where you are changing the
competitive dynamic, to cabin that, to make it narrow,
as Mark said earlier, that is going to be a more
effective remedy.

Where it is easily definable and

there are parameters around it and you can cabin it,
that’s going to affect the efficiency of a transaction
less.
MR. ISRAEL:

Just one last comment.

I think

one place sometimes we get in trouble and lose sight
of this balance is when remedies are designed to hit
some structural screen that we’re worried about.
I’m not even sure the agencies want to do
this, but a lot of parties come in and say, “Compute
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) in every local
market and we need to spin off anyplace the HHI postmerger is over 2500”; or they will say in telecom
deals, “There’s some spectrum screen and we’ve crossed
that”; or you get calls saying, “Compute every local
market and find where all the Upward Pricing Pressures
(UPPs) are above 5 percent and we’ll form a
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divestiture that way.”
are that structural.

I’m not even sure the agencies
Sometimes it’s the firms

themselves that want that kind of certainty upfront,
and you’ll say, “(a) that’s not a great way to design
a remedy and (b) it probably doesn’t even give you the
certainty that you want.”
But on both sides I think when it’s purely
structural and it’s like “Let’s just hit an HHI limit”
is the place I see we lose sight of this balance.
MR. WEISKOPF:

Fair enough.

I think we are going to have time for the
last topic.

We want to talk about the issues in

determining a divestiture buyer and ensuring it’s an
effective competitor.
Let’s start, Sonia, with some of the
characteristics that antitrust enforcement agencies
look for in a potential divestiture buyer.
MS. PFAFFENROTH:

A lot of this goes back to

what Alex already covered when he was talking about
what it takes to make an effective remedy.
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If an agency is looking at a divestiture
buyer, it wants to make sure that that buyer is
financially stable; it wants to make sure that it is
going to stay in the market, that it has the ability
to compete the assets.

Something the agencies may

look at is to see whether that divestiture buyer is
going to require financing from the merging parties,
which affects the view of the financial stability and
the ability to compete.
The agencies will look at the potential
divestiture buyer’s experience in the specific product
market that the spinoff business is in or the spinoff
assets are related to, or in a similar market product
or a similar geographic market, to determine whether
that buyer has the experience and the ability to be
able to take what it is getting as a part of the
divestiture package and be able to compete it as it
would have been competed, as it was being competed by
the company that is selling it off.
Again, that goes back to the points that
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Alex was making previously about the divestiture of a
standalone businesses being typically a divestiture
that is going to be a successful remedy, with asset
divestitures having mixed results.

In the latter

case, it may be difficult to identify the assets that
are going to be necessary.
Where an agency has an upfront buyer that
has already been identified, then the asset package
can be more tailored to what that specific divestiture
buyer is going to need.

If you’re thinking in the

abstract, maybe they need a distribution network, but
maybe the actual divestiture buyer doesn’t need the
distribution network, it has its own distribution
network.

So that would be an overly broad remedy to

put in place.
It doesn’t necessarily need to be a current
competitor in the market or an adjacent market.
Financial buyers that have industry experience, that
have individuals working with them that have
experience in that industry, can be very successful
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divestiture buyers as well.

So it’s holistically

looking at the potential buyer to see whether they
have the characteristics, the experience, that is
going to be necessary for them to - in the agency’s
view - hit the ground running, not require a huge
ramp-up, be able to put the assets into play or the
business into play before it starts to deteriorate.
I think it’s again important, as Alex said,
to make sure, particularly if you are looking at an
existing competitor, a strategic buyer, to not be
creating competitive concerns through the divestiture
that would not exist if you were looking at a
divestiture buyer that is not already a part of the
market.

So that’s something the agencies will look

at.
But it’s really a question of assessing the
divestiture buyer’s ability and incentives to be able
to compete.

That may be informed by the price at

which they are getting the divestiture package.

Is

the price so low that they wouldn’t necessarily have
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to compete quite as aggressively or in the same way?
Is there an incentive to liquidate the assets going
down the road?

All of these are things that are going

to be considered because the agency wants to make
certain that that divestiture buyer is going to stay
in the market and be successful.
MR. WEISKOPF:

Thank you.

Mark, is it problematic if the buyer
acquires ongoing support from the seller?
MR. ISRAEL:

It can be.

I think Aditi

referenced this right up-front, about this
intermediate case where there has to be some ongoing
oversight.

Obviously, there is a potential concern —

and it happens a lot — when as part of the divestiture
package there will be some sort of sales support or
training or there is some ramp-up period.

That’s

often how things are structured, that there will be
some sort of eighteen- or twenty-four-month ramp-up
period until the new divestiture buyer can be fully
on-the-ground running that they require ongoing
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support from the seller.

Obviously, if they are

competing in the same market, that creates some room
for mischief.
I think what it does really is just mean, as
I said earlier, that this distinction between
structural and behavioral all gets blurry — and Aditi
said this too — and there is this behavioral piece to
the structural remedy.
Ultimately I would evaluate it the same way
as I did before.

If what you’re saying is you are

going to set up a divestiture buyer but that
divestiture buyer is going to need an intense amount
of support across large aspects of what it does
because it’s really new to the business, then maybe
that’s not going to work.

If it’s something where you

can have more of a well-defined kind of benchmark that
they are able to do X, Y and Z and you need to provide
them support just in one additional thing, you can
define the parameters of that and make sure that
they’re hitting certain targets as far as what costs
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they are able to obtain and things, then maybe it’s
something that could work.
But I think we almost certainly have to
recognize that that’s going to require at least some
period of ongoing regulatory oversight because there
would otherwise be at least a potential incentive to
harm competition.
MR. WEISKOPF:

Thank you.

Aditi, let’s think about a merger of two
retailers.

What sort of impediments might a

divestiture buyer face in trying to be an effective
competitor in that sort of setting?
MS. MEHTA: I think if you’re looking at this
type of merger you would do what we do when we’re
evaluating any potential remedies: Think about the
full set of assets that the buyer needs.

As part of

that process you speak to potential buyers of the
divested asset, other industry participants, look at
business plans.
For a retailer there may be other things,
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like distribution assets, that are important to the
retailer that they may not already have.

If it’s a

merger of retailers, the purchaser of the divested
asset has to be someone who is not going to create
their own anticompetitive issue, as has been
mentioned.

But that may mean that they’re not very

large and they don’t have the distribution assets that
they need to run a larger retail facility.

So that

may be one thing that would need to be added to the
set of divestiture assets to make an effective
competitor.
There are more generally other things that
can be included in the set of divested assets, like
personnel or sales and marketing capabilities, supply
contracts, service contracts.
MR. WEISKOPF: Great.

Thank you.

Let’s consider a different setting.

Let’s

say two intermediate manufactured good suppliers.
Alex, in that sort of situation or industry setup,
what sort of impediments might a divestiture buyer
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face?
MR. OKULIAR:

Without repeating some of the

factors that we’ve already discussed.
Specifically with respect to intermediate
manufactured goods suppliers, they’re going to be
thinking about things like: first of all, is it a
line-of-business sale or is it just an asset sale; if
it’s just an asset sale, do we have all the requisite
assets in order to compete?
The concerns also depend in part on whether
they are a non-industry buyer or an industry buyer.
They may be able as an industry buyer to pick up a few
assets and be able to compete right out of the gate.
Another thing is: during the interim period
is there a degradation of the assets that are being
held by the divestment party, and was there a failure
by that party to maintain those assets during the
hold-separate period and the period pre-final order?
Was there a loss of key personnel?
another huge issue.
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business being divested or are the best people
leaving, say, the manufacturing facility that’s coming
over to you?

That is particularly an issue if you’re

a non-industry buyer because it is going to be harder
for you to replace those folks; you just don’t have
the network and the contacts to be able to replace
people as easily or quickly.
Sharing of confidential information with the
divestment party.

If the divestment party knows all

your costs and knows everything about your
manufacturing facility and they’re still going to be
in the general area competing with you or potentially
competing with you, that’s going to be a big issue.
So you’re going to want to be looking out for that.
I think probably the biggest issue for folks
in intermediate manufactured goods is: are they able
to maintain their customer and supplier relationships?
That’s particularly key if you’re a non-industry
buyer.

There are oftentimes change-of-control

provisions.

Customers or suppliers might try to
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renegotiate terms with you; they might try to
negotiate more favorable deals for themselves just to
keep you in business.

So that is another big issue

that is I think fairly specific to this particular
scenario.
MR. WEISKOPF:

Great.

Thank you.

Before we open it up for any audience
comments or questions, panelists, any final thoughts
or comments?
MS. PFAFFENROTH:

I would just say — and

this piggybacks on everything that Aditi and Alex were
just saying about what all the concerns may be in
those specific sectors to determine what’s going to
make for an effective remedy — you can have the
perfect divestiture package that has everything in it,
that has everything in it that would alleviate the
competitive overlaps, that should set up a standalone
competitor.

If you don’t have the right divestiture

buyer, that package isn’t going to be enough.
So it is both identifying everything that a
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buyer is going to need — and if you know who the buyer
is, that helps you tailor it to that specific buyer to
ensure success — but it really is a question of if you
put the package together, is there another company, is
there a financial buyer, that is going to be able to
take that package and be able to sustain competition
in the market with it?
MR. WEISKOPF:

Thank you.

Questions, comments?
QUESTION [Cecile Wong]:

Hi.

Alex, when you were talking about how there
are certain countries in the world that use other
issues than competition in their assessment you left
out the United States, where some mergers get reviewed
by the FCC and they also have a public-interest
standard.
MR. OKULIAR:

Right.

QUESTIONER [Ms. Wong]: One of the things
that Sprint and T-Mobile are going to come in with is
this notion that if allowed to merge they would be
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able to deploy 5G faster.

I’m trying to figure out

how smarter people in the antitrust world assess that
claim and if there’s anything you can say about it.
Are there divestitures that could fix the
problem?

We saw that four to three got rejected by

the Department of Justice just a couple of years ago.
MR. OKULIAR:

I’m not sure how much I can

say about that specific deal.

But I would say that in

terms of whether they’re able to bring 5G onto the
market more quickly, that is certainly I would think —
and I’ll turn to Mark for this — that’s certainly
something that could be creditable as a potential
efficiency or a gain for consumer welfare that would
be taken into account, and it’s something that would
not necessarily be considered a public-interest factor
that the FCC would look at.

That’s how I would come

at it and that’s what I would be thinking about.
In terms of divestitures, I really don’t
know.

Certainly in these types of deals you will see

divestitures of bandwidth, of spectrum, that go along
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with these deals to help facilitate competition in the
market and replace the lost competition.
Anything else, Mark?
MR. ISRAEL:

I’ll try to refrain from

commenting too much on that deal.
I agree there is this interesting question
of other things that come to FCC.

I think the 5G

question would be evaluated as a real competition
merger efficiency.

I do think it is potentially a

good example of where divestitures of spectrum would
have to be considered relative to the effect they had
on the ability to do that.
But I do think generally there is this issue
at FCC.

In that same deal I think there are filings

at FCC about the effect on jobs and things.
QUESTIONER [Ms. Wong]:
MR. ISRAEL:

Right, absolutely.

Obviously it’s a hot topic to

what extent that interacts with antitrust and things.
I think generally the agencies don’t think
as much about those issues.
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in particular in my experience on other deals, have
worked together pretty well to craft a unified remedy,
and things like the effects on jobs or broader
initiatives about the effect on independent voices or
communications or things that the FCC takes into
consideration are largely independent, I think, of
what the DOJ thinks about.
evaluated as much.

I don’t think they get as

There are cases in which they

cause some tension with competition approach.
But as far as your specific one about 5G, I
agree with Alex, I think that probably should be
evaluated.

If it happened, it would lead to higher-

quality mobile wireless networks and I imagine the DOJ
would think hard about that.
MR. WEISKOPF:

Thank you.

That’s a good

question.
Another question?
QUESTION [Shirley Quo]:
Mark.

This is directed to

Did I hear you correctly that you said that

antitrust agencies are not regulators?
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MR. ISRAEL:

I would draw a distinction

between antitrust and regulation.
how we define the words.

Some of this may be

My definition would be that

regulation is ongoing oversight by an agency in
constraining the behavior of those in an industry,
whereas you could say antitrust is a very specific
form of regulation, but I like to think of it as
almost the opposite, that the role is to maintain
market structures in a way that the market selfregulates through competition.
MS. MEHTA:

That’s how we view it as well.

MR. WEISKOPF:
QUESTION:

Other questions, comments?

Would any of the members of the

panel please elaborate a little bit more about the
Chinese walls as remedies?

I work for the Spanish

Competition Authority and we have a lot of trouble
making Chinese walls actually work.

Sometimes I have

the feeling that they are kind of away from our
countries because we are not really sure how to make
them work.
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MR. ISRAEL:

This seems like a better

question for the lawyers.
MR. OKULIAR:

I can say simply from

experience when I was at DOJ that we imposed firewalls
in a couple of our consents when I was there and had
oversight, we had someone at the agency who served as
a monitor, and they appear to have worked.
I think one of the difficulties with
firewalls is that ultimately they are kind of hard for
the agency to enforce.

They are sort of self-

enforced, so if there is information exchanged it
would be very difficult for the agency to pick up on
that, unless there is an immediate effect in the
marketplace or if there is something in the
documentation, so if the parties share documentation
and the agency monitor sees that of course.

But that

is a fairly unlikely scenario.
MS. PFAFFENROTH:

Yes, and I think it goes

to the overall enforceability and ongoing monitoring
that’s required by different types of behavioral

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

82

remedies.

But for the firewalls in particular you

will see consent decree provisions that impose a
firewall and also compliance programs to monitor and
make sure that they are being enforced.
Is there a possibility that companies will
disregard the law and be in violation of the decree?
Certainly it is a possibility.

But I think in

practical effect you assume and hope that companies
that are committing to that type of decree, which is
enforceable in a court, are putting in place the
structures and the safeguards necessary to make sure
that the information flow is being constrained in the
way that it is intended to be.
MR. ISRAEL:

I guess I will say one thing.

I think this goes to the discussion about arbitration.
Probably for both behavioral structural remedies none
of them work perfectly.

Sometimes I think the debate

will become somebody proposes a remedy — especially if
it’s like an FCC process where there is public debate
or litigation, a remedy is proposed, and then the
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response is kind of “Here’s all the limitations of
that remedy, and those are true.”
That’s why I said at the beginning I think
you’re thinking about these things mostly in deals
that are kind of close calls and where you see a lot
of benefits and you’re just saying, “We hope that the
firewall makes it harder for that behavior that we’re
worried about” or “We hope that the arbitration pushes
things in one direction.”
To me the only way to think about these
things is that they somewhat reduce the risk of things
we’re concerned about such that the balance tips in
favor of the efficiencies.

I think if our standard

when we debate them becomes “Do they work entirely as
anticipated?” we probably would end up rejecting all
of them.
MR. WEISKOPF:

Ben?

QUESTION [Benjamin Wagner]:

How do the

agencies think about ownership when they’re thinking
about divestitures?

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

I’m thinking about situations

84

where there are franchises, like if Domino’s and Pizza
Hut merged or something and there was an overlap that
the same franchisee owned.

For those two locations

where there was overlap did those not require
divestiture?

How do the agencies tend to think about

those kinds of things?
MR. OKULIAR:

I’ve been involved in one deal

where there were franchisees and they were treated as
being part of the company.
the company.

They were associated with

Where there was an overlap of

franchisees, that was considered something that might
need to be divested.
MS. MEHTA:

It probably depends on how

independently they behave in how pricing works and
things like that.
MR. WEISKOPF:

Thank you, panelists, for a

lively and insightful discussion.
We’ll have a short break and then we’re
going to pick back up with the second panel on Merger
Retrospectives at 11 o’clock.
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[Break: 10:48−11:00 a.m.]
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